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I. INTRODUCTION
Class action litigation is in a period of transition.  Many scholars,
including myself, have observed the slow demise of class actions in
federal court in the wake of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA),1 and the Supreme Court decisions that followed.  Indeed,
some scholars have even begun imagining the shape of mass tort liti-
gation in a “post-class action era.”2  However, the end of the Supreme
Court’s most recent term brought a chorus of relief from the plaintiffs’
bar.  This was a Supreme Court term that some had once feared would
hasten the end of federal class actions, but the term concluded without
any tectonic shifts in the procedural landscape of aggregate litiga-
tion.3  The respite taken by the Supreme Court in reshaping class ac-
tion doctrine is not a signal of the doctrine’s stability, however.  The
instability of the class action landscape seems to have instead merely
relocated to lower courts for now.4
While the Roberts Court created increasingly insurmountable bar-
riers to certification of nationwide classes in federal court,5 mass tort
litigation did not simply vanish into thin air.  When federal courts
(mostly) closed their doors to nationwide class actions, some of the dis-
putes shifted into federal multidistrict litigation composed of many
similar individual suits consolidated for pretrial proceedings.6  Others
fragmented into smaller class actions, some of which stayed in state
acknowledge the helpful contribution of the research assistants who assisted me
with this project: Ben Aguin˜aga (Class of 2015), Derek Warden (Class of 2016),
and Simon McCloud (Class of 2017).  Any remaining errors are entirely my own.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715.  For examples of commentary discussing
the demise, see, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Liti-
gation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI.  L. REV. 623, 658
(2012) (describing class actions as being “on the ropes”); Jeremy Hays, The Quasi-
Class Action Model for Limiting Attorneys’ Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 589, 601 (2012) (discussing the waning utility of class
actions under Rule 23 and the imperfect nature of MDL as a replacement);
Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56
(2012) (“Mass tort class actions have virtually disappeared . . . .”); Margaret S.
Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63
EMORY L. J. 1339, 1346 & n.37.
2. See, e.g., Mark Moller, The New Class Action Federalism, 48 AKRON L. REV. 861,
868 (2015) (discussing a term coined by Professor Glover); J. Maria Glover, Mass
Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The Problems and Promise of
Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 1, 7 (2014).
3. See Perry Cooper, Class Actions at SCOTUS: The Term That Wasn’t, BLOOMBERG
BNA (July 13, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/class-actions-at-scotus-the-term-that-
wasnt/ [https://perma.unl.edu/PAB3-62T9].
4. Id. (observing that while the Supreme Court awaits a ninth justice to replace
Justice Scalia, “[I]t appears that the circuit courts are the effective courts of last
resort for federal issues involving class [actions]”).
5. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 2, at 862.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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courts.7  Mark Moller has suggested this unintended result of the Su-
preme Court’s contraction of nationwide class actions in the post-
CAFA era created a kind of “accidental federalism” through the frag-
mentation and dispersal of mass tort litigation.8
This Article’s focus is on a different kind of federalism in mass
torts: the integrity of states as independent systems of adjudication
for mass tort litigation.  Specifically, it identifies the enormous pres-
sure being placed upon this independence in the fragmented, dis-
persed pieces of mass tort litigation that happen to land in state court
systems in the post-CAFA era.  This form of federalism is not acciden-
tal or “happenstantial.”9  Rather, it is an essential and fundamental
structural feature of our federal constitutional system.  The indepen-
dence of state courts as separate systems of civil adjudication is under
pressure from a wave of arguments from defendants seeking to na-
tionalize class action procedure through an aggressive reworking of
constitutional due process doctrine that would wipe away state varia-
tions in class certification procedures.
A little-noticed battle for the future of complex litigation appears to
be underway in state supreme courts.  The relocation of class action’s
doctrinal battles to state courts is astonishing, as not long ago, state
courts seemed to fade away in importance in complex litigation be-
cause of CAFA’s reforms: CAFA was designed to facilitate the removal
of many class actions from state courts to federal courts, causing the
number of class actions in state courts to plummet.10  Once in federal
court, a wave of Supreme Court decisions then raised the bar to certi-
fying classes in most mass tort cases.11  Since CAFA facilitated re-
7. See Moller, supra note 2, at 865–66.
8. Id. at 867.
9. Cf. id. at 882.
10. See id. at 863, 866 (observing that CAFA facilitates removal by expanding diver-
sity to encompass minimal diversity between any named plaintiff or putative
class member and any defendant); Laura J. Hines, Mirroring or Muscling: An
Examination of State Class Action Appellate Rulemaking, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
1027, 1038 (2010) (“[S]tate class actions post-CAFA have undoubtedly de-
clined . . . .”); Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical
Analysis of Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L.
REV. 809, 825–27 (2010) (noting a significant reduction in class action filings in
Oklahoma State courts post-CAFA); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas Willging, The
Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1762 (2008) (“The
findings . . . provide strong support for the conclusion that CAFA has caused the
number of diversity class actions filed in and removed to the federal courts to
increase appreciably.”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 729, 745 (2013) (“CAFA has . . . had an enormous impact in shifting
most class actions to federal court.”).
11. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Comcast v. Behr-
end, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).  The wave of precedent stretches back to an era pre-
ceding CAFA, to Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz
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moval of more suits into federal court, complex litigation scholars
naturally focused on the rapid reshaping of the class action landscape
by those federal courts.12  The resulting post-CAFA decline in the util-
ity of federal class actions as a means of resolving complex mass tort
disputes has been well captured by academic commentators.13  CAFA,
combined with the Supreme Court’s tightening of the understanding
of the federal procedures for certification, seemed to have narrowed
the space in which class actions could operate.  This has been the con-
ventional narrative for quite some time, but this narrative captures
only part of the picture of what is transpiring.
This conventional post-CAFA mass torts narrative misses the de-
velopment of the movement in state supreme courts to constitutional-
ize class certification.  State class actions did not entirely vanish.
Despite CAFA’s robust sweep of cases into federal court, its plain
terms contemplated space for at least some class actions that would
continue to be decided by state courts, although that space would be
smaller.14  Within that small space in state courts, monumentally im-
portant changes are occurring in the kind of arguments being used to
oppose class certification.
The state-by-state battle over class certification procedure is still
in its early stages and has largely been overlooked by scholars, who
have understandably fixed their gaze on developments in federal
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), which limited federal courts’ ability to
certify nationwide classes to facilitate settlements of mass tort cases. See
Thomas, supra note 1, at 1346 & n.37; Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace:
A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 747
(2006); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV.
183, 208.
12. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 2, 864 (reviewing post-CAFA scholarship).
13. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2, 1346 & n.37 (summarizing academic commen-
tary); Sergio Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1063
(2012) (“[A]lmost all courts and scholars disfavor the use of class actions in mass
tort litigation because the class action device infringes upon each plaintiff’s au-
tonomy over the tort claim.”).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  For example, class actions with fewer than 100 peo-
ple, or with an aggregate value under $5 million, or lacking minimal diversity
were excluded from its jurisdictional ambit.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).  Con-
gress also included a “local controversy exception,” exempting from removal clas-
ses where two-thirds of the class-members are from the forum state, at least one
defendant is also a member of the forum state, the defendant’s conduct in that
state formed a significant basis for the claim, and the class is seeking significant
relief from that defendant for injuries that occurred in the state. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(4)(B).  Congress also created both a mandatory and permissive “home
state” abstention exception, depriving federal courts entirely of jurisdiction,
where two-thirds of the proposed class members are from the forum state, and
the primary defendants are also citizens of the state, and allowing permissive
abstention when more than one-third but less than two-thirds of the class mem-
bers are from the forum state (and again, the primary defendants are too).  28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
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courts in the post-CAFA era.  The conventional narrative focused aca-
demic attention on the one-two punch of Congress (enacting CAFA to
facilitate more federal removal) and the Supreme Court (issuing a se-
ries of important decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 to make class actions less likely to survive).15  This narrative
has helped to mask a seismic shift that is occurring in the manner in
which defendants present arguments about certification in state
courts, and this shift has profound implications for federal courts, too.
While a long line of Supreme Court decisions has focused on inter-
preting Federal Rule 23, state courts are not constrained to follow this
precedent in their own certification of class actions filed in state court.
Instead, defendants are often focusing state certification arguments
on the U.S. Constitution.  This tactic seeks to limit state procedural
choices in certifying class actions, constraining states through an ex-
pansive interpretation of the civil defendants’ due process rights.  The
tactic aims to constitutionalize the class certification process.
Defendants have attacked certification of class actions in state
courts with an array of constitutional arguments about the process for
certification.  These arguments have been percolating through state
courts (and sometimes even lower federal courts), without having yet
reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  Despite, or maybe because of, the
Supreme Court’s silence on the matter, they are becoming an increas-
ingly important feature of the class certification landscape.
Many of the constitutional arguments against class certification
are already well worn.  Almost as long as there have been class ac-
tions, defendants have complained that curtailing their right to bring
individual defenses would violate due process.16  Arguments along
these lines have long been asserted sporadically in lower courts, some-
times for decades; the arguments have become mainstream, stock ar-
guments—and they now seem to be gaining some traction in some
state courts and lower federal courts.
The academic commentary thus far has generally treated the vary-
ing constitutional arguments raised by class action defendants in dif-
ferent contexts in state and federal courts as dwelling in distinct
15. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 2, at 867; Glover, supra note 2, at 8–10.
16. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing the
defendant’s constitutional “right to present a full defense”); Joseph v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp. 109 F.R.D. 635 (D. Colo. 1986) (rejecting the defendant’s “contention
that certification of a class action in this case would violate its right to due pro-
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing it from asserting
individual defenses”); In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736 (N.J. 1983)
(rejecting the defendant’s “contention that certification of a class action would
violate its right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by
preventing it from asserting individual defenses, such as the treatment of the
vehicles by each plaintiff and actual reliance on [the defendant]’s
representations”).
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doctrinal silos.  For example, arguments objecting to certifying a class
seeking punitive damages have been analyzed with reference to the
specialized constitutional doctrine developed for punitive damages in
individual litigation.17  Arguments about individual proof and statisti-
cal modeling, by contrast, have been treated as having a different doc-
trinal pedigree, closely linked to procedural due process.18
This Article offers a fresh perspective by weaving together differ-
ent threads of constitutional arguments related to class certification to
demonstrate their common function in the class certification process.
It takes these different doctrinal species of constitutional objections to
certification and shows that they have a common purpose in the pro-
cess.  Each of these species attempts to shift certification from a rule-
based decision to a constitutional one based on arguments about class
members lacking sufficient commonality to allow for class-wide adju-
dication of defenses.  In other words, it constitutionalizes the common-
ality inquiry.  Connecting these different constitutional objections to
class certification reveals that collectively they aim to create one ho-
mogeneous certification scheme in state and federal court, grounded
in a new, defendant-focused interpretation of procedural due process.
This Article concludes that this defendant-centric expansion of pro-
cedural due process conflicts with the flexible, pragmatic view at the
heart of the Supreme Court’s modern procedural due process jurispru-
dence, and more importantly, with the fundamental values of federal-
ism at the heart of our civil justice system.  It is a direct assault on the
independence of state courts as separate, distinct systems.
Constitutionalizing class certification is a powerful reform strat-
egy, in that it would impact not only class actions litigated in federal
court, but also nonremovable state class actions being litigated under
state rules that differ from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  It is a
challenge to the rulemaking processes of all fifty states, as well as the
Federal Rules.
This Article has two objectives.  It seeks first to create a typology of
these emerging constitutional challenges to certification and contextu-
17. See, e.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s
Recent Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880,
905–08 (2008) (arguing cases reviewing punitive damages in individual litigation
should apply to class certification); James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere or
Jurisprudential U-Turn? The Intersection of Punitive Damage Class Actions and
the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763, 765 (2009) (evaluating the
relationship between due process limits on punitive damages and class certifica-
tion); Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damages Class, 58 U. KAN. L.
REV. 845, 876 (2010) (discussing the implications of the Supreme Court’s punitive
damages constitutional doctrine for punitive damages classes); see also Katherine
E. Lamm, Work in Progress: Civil Rights Class Actions after Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 173–74 (2015) (discussing commonality issues
related to damages in class certification).
18. See supra note 16.
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alize them.  It argues that these challenges share fundamental simi-
larities in their approach to the class certification process.  While due
process in class actions has historically focused on the rights of absent
members of the plaintiff class, this new species of argument attempts
to reframe the constitutional inquiry by focusing on the defendant’s
procedural rights.  Importantly, the goal of this Article is not to re-
solve all the debates within all the doctrines in these varying constitu-
tional arguments.  Its goal is more modestly to show that they are
connected in their functioning within the class certification process,
and that connection reveals the strategic purpose and systemic risks.
The collection of constitutional arguments against class certifica-
tion generally lacks a coherent constitutional foundation at present
and challenges fundamental principles of federalism with regard to
the separateness of state judicial procedures.  Part II introduces the
emerging constitutional shift in class certification in lower courts.
Part III then turns to the historical understanding of due process in
the context of class actions and the scholarly literature on due process
in complex litigation.  Part IV then reconstructs federalism as a value
in the functioning of state courts as independent adjudicatory sys-
tems, connecting it to the class certification process.  This Article ulti-
mately concludes that the constitutionalization of class certification
undermines important federalism values by seeking a national, uni-
form class certification procedure.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SHIFT IN CLASS CERTIFICATION
There are several different threads of constitutional argumenta-
tion that have crystallized in the arguments of defendants opposing
class certification.  One of them is unique to federal court, focusing on
the requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution.  This
thread, though, has a little-noticed connection to state courts through
state standing doctrines.  The other threads of argumentation are dif-
ferent, focusing on how one proves liability and damages in a class
action—by attacking the commonality of the issues of facts and law
that hold a class together in a class action.  This latter species empha-
sizes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amend-
ments, with equal relevance in state and federal court.  If successful,
these arguments taken together have the potential to be near-univer-
sal “class action killers.”  However, when deconstructed, they are fun-
damentally part of a process to constitutionalize the procedure to
certify a class in any court, state or federal.
A. BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Muddies Article III’s Limits on Class
Standing in Federal Court
The constitutional shift in class certification gathered momentum
in the late 1990s, but it seems to have recently progressed at a furious
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pace.  In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court an-
nounced in dicta that class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 “must be interpreted in keeping with Article III con-
straints.”19  This simple assertion has inspired a new line of argumen-
tation in federal class actions, where class members may be damaged
unevenly, with some absent class members having little or no harm
traceable to the defendant.
Recently, the Deepwater Horizon litigation in the Fifth Circuit put
this argument on vivid display.  The litigation stemmed from the Brit-
ish Petroleum (BP) oil spill in 2010, which contaminated the Gulf of
Mexico with millions of barrels of oil.20  BP argued that Article III has
an implicit requirement of causation (i.e., that damages claimed by
class members were specifically caused by the alleged class conduct).
BP specifically attacked the constitutionality of settlement payments
to class members who could not present individualized proof that BP’s
conduct, with regard to the oil spill, caused these claimants’ economic
damages.  BP’s argument connected the Amchem dicta with the
Court’s doctrine of constitutional standing under Article III.21
The Fifth Circuit allowed the class to be certified, even though it
allegedly included uninjured plaintiffs.22 BP had agreed to a proposed
settlement in April 2012 with a class of individuals and businesses
claiming to be damaged by the spill.23  Instead of ending the litigation,
the settlement was the start of a new, complex dispute about the in-
terpretation of the settlement’s terms, who could submit claims under
it, and whether the district court’s interpretation of it violated BP’s
due process rights.
BP’s position was that the interpretation of the settlement claims
administrator (and district court) regarding the proof needed to file a
claim wrongly permitted “class members” who suffered no injury
whatsoever from the spill to submit claims for payment.24  According
to the defendant, this interpretation had the effect of including unin-
jured parties within the class.25  BP claimed this violated Article III’s
standing requirement.
After a long and winding procedural history with multiple appeals
to different panels of the Fifth Circuit and multiple remands back to
the trial court, the Fifth Circuit eventually approved class certifica-
19. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
20. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2014), cert denied sub nom.
BP Expl. & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014).
21. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996).
22. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 795.
23. Id. at 986.
24. Id. at 796–98.
25. Id. at 796–98.
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tion, rejecting BP’s constitutional challenges.26  In the first of a series
of appellate decisions, the circuit found that the named plaintiffs all
had standing under Article III because these class representatives’
own injuries were caused by the oil spill.27  Further, even if one were
to consider the absent class members, the court found that the class
definition also covered them by requiring all claimants to have “exper-
ienced ‘[l]oss of income, earnings or profits . . . as a result of the DEEP-
WATER HORIZON INCIDENT.’”28  Importantly, the court concluded
the Constitution did not require a strict evidentiary standard that
might ferret out parties receiving unwarranted payments.29  BP thus
had no right to proof of injury from all of the claimants once the class
was certified for settlement.
A second appellate decision from a different Fifth Circuit panel
then approved the district court’s interpretation of the settlement
agreement.30  The Fifth Circuit interpreted the settlement agreement
to allow claimants to certify, under penalty of perjury, that their inju-
ries had been caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill in lieu of submit-
ting proof of causation to support their claim.31  The Fifth Circuit thus
understood the settlement to be an express agreement by BP to accept
the claimants’ certification statements as sufficient proof that the in-
juries were traceable to the disaster.32  The court found this to be a
rational business choice in light of “the practical problem [that] mass
processing of claims such as these presents.”33
The majority’s decision in this case was groundbreaking in that it
created space for the absent class members’ standing to derive from
the settlement agreement itself in a class action certified for settle-
ment.  In a spirited dissent, Judge Clement argued that a settlement
class action, where “the certification stage and the proof stage have
been combined,” should not be designed in a way that would allow
recovery by claimants whose injuries have nothing to do with the de-
fendant’s conduct.34
26. Id. at 795, 798.
27. Id. at 802.
28. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2012, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 967 (E.D. La. 2012)
(appendix), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F. 3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id.
30. In re Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom.
BP Expl. & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014).
31. Id. at 376.
32. Id. at 377 (“It was a contractual concession by BP to limit the issue of factual
causation in the processing of claims.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 383, 384 (Clement, J, dissenting) (“But these plaintiffs have no injury trace-
able to BP’s actions, and would not have standing to maintain a suit
individually . . . .”).
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BP filed a petition for certiorari, supported by an army of amici.35
The Supreme Court declined the invitation to take up the dispute.36
The case was likely too complicated a vehicle to present the issue,
given the complexity of the settlement agreement and its procedural
posture.
Although the holding with regard to standing deriving from the
settlement terms was novel, the Fifth Circuit’s flexible approach in
the In re Deepwater Horizon case aligned it with a plurality of five
circuits permitting a class action to be certified even though all of the
class members cannot show individual proof of satisfying Article III’s
standing requirement (e.g., either the named class representatives or
most of the class members meet Article III standing requirements).  In
other words, these circuits do not require every member of the class to
be able to prove standing.  For example, the First Circuit allows a “de
minimis” number of uninjured members in a certified class.37  Like
the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit similarly uses a flexible stan-
dard that seeks to avoid too many uninjured class members.38  The
Third Circuit requires only that the named class representatives show
Article III standing and does not require absent class members to
35. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Federation of German Industries, Confederation of
British Industry, American Chamber of Commerce in Germany, and British
American Business in Support of Petitioners, BP Expl. & Prod. Inc. v. Lake Euge-
nie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-123), 2014 WL 4380097; Brief
of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, BP Expl. &
Prod. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (No. 14-123), 2014 WL 4404764; Brief of Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Special Master of the Federal September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001 and Administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (No. 14-
123), 2014 WL 4404763; Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (No. 14-123), 2014
WL 4380922; Brief for Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, The United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, The Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, The American Tort Reform Association, and
The American Petroleum Institute in Support of Petitioners, BP Expl. & Prod.
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (No. 14-123), 2014 WL 4380921.
36. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754.
37. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 32 (1st Cir. 2015).
38. Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health System, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that determining how many uninjured class members is too many is “a
matter of degree, and will turn on the facts as they appear from case to case”); see
also Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-
ing that “a class should not be certified if it is apparent that it contains a great
many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant . . .”).
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meet that standard.39  The Ninth Circuit is in accord with the Third
Circuit, focusing attention on the class representatives.40
By contrast, the Second Circuit requires that a class be defined so
that “anyone within it would have standing,” though it has no require-
ment that each member of the class submit evidence of personal
standing.41  The Eighth Circuit has drawn a bright line, rejecting cer-
tification if a class contains uninjured members.42
So far, the Supreme Court has declined to step into this circuit
split, leaving the lower courts to work through the defendants’ argu-
ments on Article III class standing without definitive guidance.  It ap-
peared to grant certiorari on that question in its last term, in Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.43  However, the defendant-petitioner aban-
doned that issue in its merits brief,44 removing it from the Court’s
consideration.  In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, another case decided in the
Court’s last term, the Court clarified that a class representative must
have standing in the form of a particularized and concrete injury.45
The decision offers no guidance on the situation faced by BP, where it
was the absent class members who allegedly sustained no injury.46
The relationship between absent class members and Article III stand-
ing doctrine remains open in the Supreme Court.
The scope of this Article III argument, though, is necessarily lim-
ited to proceedings in federal court—and federal courts have generally
treated this as a standing problem, not a due process problem.  How-
39. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
‘cases or controversies’ requirement is satisfied so long as a class representative
has standing, whether in the context of a settlement or litigation class.  This rule
is compelled by In re Prudential and buttressed by a historical review of repre-
sentative actions.”).
40. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012); Stearns v. Tick-
etmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[O]ur law keys on the repre-
sentative party, not all of the class members, and has done so for many years.”).
41. Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added).
42. Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In order
for a class to be certified, each member must have standing and show an injury in
fact that is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed in a favorable
decision.”); see also Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir.
2009) (citing the Lujan injury requirement intrinsic to the “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of standing”).
43. 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016) (“In its petition for certiorari petitioner framed its
second question presented as whether a class may be certified if it contains ‘mem-
bers who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.’”).
44. Id. (“[Petitioner] now concedes that the fact that federal courts lack authority to
compensate persons who cannot prove injury does not mean that a class action
(or collective action) can never be certified in the absence of proof that all class
members were injured.”) (internal quotations omitted).
45. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 n.6 (2016).
46. See, e.g., Mark A. Perry, Spokeo and Absent Class Member Standing, 38 Class
Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 841, 17 CLASS 841 (BL) (Aug. 12, 2016).
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ever, many states have their own parallel standing doctrine—even
though they are not constrained by Article III.47  F. Andrew Hessick’s
survey of variations in state standing doctrines reveals that several
states have an injury-in-fact test parallel to federal standing doc-
trine.48  Others use the injury-in-fact test as a default, but subject it to
exceptions.49  Still others have developed a standing doctrine with a
looser test looking for an alleged violation of the plaintiff’s legal
rights.50  For states using some version of the injury-in-fact test in-
spired by federal doctrine, any federal developments regarding stand-
ing have the potential to spill over into state systems through federal
opinions treated as persuasive authority, even if not binding on the
state courts.  Moreover, the causation component in the standing ar-
guments (i.e., that a concrete, particularized injury was caused by the
defendant’s conduct) is easily labeled as a form of due process in the
briefing.  It would thus be a mistake to view the controversy over ab-
sent class members’ injuries to have no implications for state courts.
The Article III argument about uninjured class members is also
fundamentally an argument about whether the class is sufficiently co-
hesive in the sense of having enough in common to bind the class to-
gether.  The argument presents the putative class as including
members who are very different from one another: named class mem-
bers who can offer proof of their injury and its causation, and absent
class members who lack such proof.  The differences between the al-
legedly uninjured class members and the class representatives are ele-
vated in this argument to a constitutional distinction depriving some
47. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1838 (2001) (noting that many state courts
adhere to the model for standing found in Article III); accord id. at 1854 (“The
source of standing rules varies from state to state, as does their content.”); F.
Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57,
66–68 (2014) (discussing the various approaches that the states take in regards
to the standing requirement); see also, e.g., Chiatello v. City of San Francisco, 117
Cal. Rptr. 3d 169, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“Standing is a jurisdictional issue
that . . . must be established in some appropriate manner.”); ACLU of N.M. v.
City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1227 (N.M. 2008) (“While we recognize that
standing in our state courts does not have the constitutional dimensions that are
present in federal court, New Mexico’s standing jurisprudence indicates that our
state courts have long been guided by the traditional federal standing analysis.”);
Soc’y of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (N.Y. 1991)
(“The existence of an injury in fact—an actual legal stake in the matter being
adjudicated—ensures that the party seeking review has some concrete interest in
prosecuting the action which casts the dispute ‘in a form traditionally capable of
judicial resolution.’”).
48. Hessick, supra note 47, at 66 (identifying Rhode Island, Wyoming, Indiana, and
Arizona as examples).
49. Id. at 67 & n.65 (identifying Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia as examples).
50. Id. at 66–67 (identifying California, Louisiana, and New Hampshire as
examples).
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class members of standing.  The lack of cohesiveness in the class,
though, is key: this argument presumes there is a constitutional floor
in class cohesion, and once one passes that floor, no class may be certi-
fied.  The defendants usually argue, as BP did, that any class member
unable to show causation is a constitutional defect.  This illustrates
that the goal of this argument is to litigate causation individually,
class member by class member.  As we shall see in section II.B, the
same focus on cohesiveness underlies another species of argument
under the Due Process Clause.
B. Defendant Due Process Rights in Class Actions in State
Courts
1. Montana’s Example: Class-Wide Punitive Damages
Meanwhile, a different, more wide-reaching species of constitu-
tional argument appeared recently in a Montana Supreme Court
case.51  The case raised a trio of due process arguments in the certifi-
cation of a class under state class action rules.  The most important of
these was an argument that the U.S. Constitution forbids certifying
class claims if any individual defenses would be eliminated from con-
sideration in the litigation.  The defendant sought to establish that
due process barred the certification of such class actions in state
courts (potentially barring all punitive damages claims from class ac-
tions as a constitutional matter).52
In Jacobsen v. Allstate Insurance Co.,53 the class challenged the
defendant’s insurance claim settlement practices in the state of Mon-
tana.  The case was certified as a class action under the Montana’s
own class action rule, Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The class
argued that Allstate’s claims handling policy intentionally misled
claimants by suggesting they would get more money without an attor-
ney, whereas claimants represented by counsel actually received sig-
nificantly more compensation for their claims.54  The class further
claimed the claims handling procedures resulted in unfair settle-
ments.55  The class definition included “all unrepresented individuals
who had either third-party claims or first-party claims” under All-
state’s Claim Core Process Redesign policy, implemented in the 1990s
51. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (Mont. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2135 (2014).
52. See Brief of Amicus Curiae DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar in Support of
Allstate Insurance Company, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13–916), 2014 WL
847543.
53. 310 P.3d 452.
54. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 456.
55. Id.
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to reduce total payouts, in part, by persuading claimants not to hire
legal counsel.56
The state trial court certified the class after narrowing the class
definition to include only unrepresented claimants who filed first-
party or third-party claims with Allstate in motor-vehicle accidents in
excess of the policy deductible, with claims adjusted in Montana under
the specific Allstate procedure adopted in the mid-1990s.57  Although
Montana’s Rule 23 tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the state
court did not view itself as bound by federal interpretations of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, except as persuasive authority.  In other
words, the state court read the Supreme Court’s opinion restricting
class certification in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes58 as a case limited to
rule interpretation.  Without a constitutional basis, Dukes’s interpre-
tation of Rule 23 could not bind the state court.
The Montana Supreme Court approached class certification under
the state rule the same way a federal court would: starting with Rule
23(a)’s four requirements (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy).59  There was no dispute that the six hundred members of
the class were sufficiently numerous.60  The court also found little rea-
son to doubt typicality or adequacy.61  The dispute turned on state’s
own requirement of “commonality” (i.e., the need for “questions of law
or fact common to the class”).62  The state requirement for commonal-
ity uses language that exactly tracks Federal Rule 23.63
Although Montana had a history of relying on federal precedent to
interpret the state’s own version of Rule 23,64 the state court declined
to decide whether to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of
that rule in Dukes.  It distinguished the Allstate dispute on its facts:
unlike Wal-Mart in the Dukes case, here Allstate had a company-wide
policy guiding its claim settlement, and that policy that was the basis
for each class member’s claim, making this a relatively straightfor-
ward commonality analysis compared to Dukes (where there was no
company-wide policy connecting all the class members’ claims).65
However, once the court turned its attention to Rule 23(b), the de-
fendant’s constitutional arguments gained some traction.  That part of
the rule in Montana defines allowable types of class actions.  The class
56. Id. at 456, 458.
57. Id. at 457.
58. 564 U.S. 338 (2011)
59. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 25-20-23 (2015).
60. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 460.
61. Id. at 470–71.
62. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 25-20-23(a)(2) (2015).
63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
64. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d at 460–61 (citing Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare Corp., 288 P.3d
193, 208 (Mont. 2012)).
65. Id. at 462–63.
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had been certified under Montana’s version of Rule 23(b)(2), which
mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) in permitting classes
seeking injunctive relief where relief is proper as to the class as a
whole.66  The state trial court had certified four forms of relief: (1) de-
claratory relief as to the unlawfulness of the claims handling proce-
dure; (2) injunctive relief requiring Allstate to re-adjust class
members’ claims; (3) class-wide punitive damages upon a finding of
malice; and (4) attorney fees paid to a common fund.67
The state supreme court reversed the certification of class-wide pu-
nitive damages, finding due process implied a right to raise individu-
alized defenses, even though it had already found Allstate subjected
the entire class to the same class-wide policy.68  The state supreme
court’s solution was to resolve the common issue of the company-wide
claims procedure’s lawfulness in one class action, after which individ-
ual class members could pursue individual compensatory and punitive
damages in separate damages trials.  The class action would thus sur-
vive, but it would decide only one aspect of each class member’s claim
and require subsequent, individual litigation over damages (including
punitive damages).69
Allstate sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.70  All-
state’s petition raised due process issues related to the state’s certifi-
cation of the class, including a constitutional right present of
individual defenses.71  The petition was supported by six different
amicus curiae briefs.72  Despite the strong business community sup-
66. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 25-20-23(b)(2) (2015) (defining an allowable class to in-
clude situations where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”); Ja-
cobsen, 310 P.3d at 471–72.
67. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d. at 471.
68. Id. at 475 (“Allstate should be able to establish defenses to individual claims to
ensure that punitive damages are not awarded to claimants that were not actu-
ally damaged by the adjustment of their claims under the [claims handling
procedure].”).
69. Id. at 464–66.
70. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014
WL 342624.  Its certiorari petition was authored by the law firm that had won
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes several years earlier. Id. at i. (showing brief submitted
by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher).  The same law firm also happened to be BP’s ap-
pellate counsel in the unsuccessful certiorari petition in the Deepwater Horizon
litigation. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, BP Expl. & Prod. Inc. v. Lake
Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014) (No. 14-123), 2014 WL 3834540.
71. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014
WL 342624, at *i.
72. See Brief of the Cato Institute and Center for Class Action Fairness as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL
847538; Brief of Amicus Curiae DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar in Support of
Allstate Insurance Company, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL
847543, at *4 (citing Justice Scalia’s stay order in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v.
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port for granting certiorari, the Court declined to take up the due pro-
cess arguments and refused to review the case.73
2. Pennsylvania’s Example: Wal-Mart Redux
In Pennsylvania, the state took a different approach to due process
arguments recently packaged as a challenge to “trial by formula” in
class actions.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores
v. Dukes74 seemingly doomed nationwide class actions in employment
litigation, the employee claims against Wal-Mart splintered.  Wal-
Mart employees around the country filed several smaller class actions
against the company alleging various employment violations.  In other
words, the disputes fractured into many regional cases after the na-
tionwide class failed before the Supreme Court.  One of those “son of
Dukes” actions was Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, a case filed in Penn-
sylvania state court on behalf of a class of Wal-Mart employees alleg-
ing wage and hour violations that ultimately resulted in a judgment of
over $187.6 million.75
The employees claimed that Wal-Mart failed to compensate them
for rest breaks and off-the-clock work as required by Wal-Mart’s own
policies and state law.76  The state court certified a class in 2005 con-
sisting of “all current and former hourly employees of Wal-Mart in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from March 19, 1998 to the pre-
sent.”77  After a thirty-two-day jury trial, in which Wal-Mart called
eighteen fact witnesses and three experts,78 Wal-Mart prevailed on
claims related to meal periods but lost on rest breaks and off-the-clock
work.79  The jury awarded $2.5 million for the rest break claims alone.
Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers)); Brief for the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America, the American Tort Reform Association,
the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and the Property Cas-
ualty Insurers Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ja-
cobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 847542; Brief of Washington Legal
Foundation and International Association of Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 847540;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Petitioner, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 847539; Brief of Aller-
gan, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Facebook, Inc., General Electric Co., Google Inc.,
Intel Corp., Microsoft Corp., and Pepsico, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452 (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 825203.
73. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (2014).
74. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
75. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 24 A.3d 875, 883 (Penn. Super. Ct. 2011) (per
curiam).
76. Id. at 885.
77. Id. at 886.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 889.
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In posttrial proceedings, the state court added statutory, liqui-
dated damages for each class member, totaling $62.25 million, and
$45.7 million in attorney fees, as well as interest and other state stat-
utory penalties.  This resulted in a $187.6 million aggregate judgment.
On appeal, the state’s intermediate appellate court relied on Penn-
sylvania law to conclude the liquidated damages required by state
statute are not punitive, but rather are compensatory.80  It affirmed
the verdict with minor modifications.  Wal-Mart had raised a due pro-
cess challenge based on the fact that the verdict had been reached by
extrapolating damages based on the testimony of six employees who
testified.  The court flatly rejected the idea that Wal-Mart had a right
to question every single member of the class under Pennsylvania’s
class action procedure.
Wal-Mart then sought and obtained review from the state supreme
court on the issue of the statistical extrapolation.81  It argued that it
was entitled to proof from each class member rather than extrapola-
tion.  Wal-Mart’s principal argument alleged its due process rights
were violated when the trial court subjected it to a “trial by formula,”
a procedural practice disfavored by the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in the Dukes de-
cision.82  The state supreme court observed that there was no
extrapolation used in the trial court as to liability; rather, it was used
only for calculating damages to the class as a whole.83  Here, unlike
Dukes, there was evidence of a company-wide policy.84  Unlike the
Montana Supreme Court, which also had a company-wide policy
before it, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that
damages must be calculated individually and that tabulating class-
wide damages would violate due process.85  It thus affirmed the deci-
sion below.
Wal-Mart petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in the Pennsylvania case.  The petition presented a
single issue: “Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state court from certifying a class action, and
80. Id. at 970.
81. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 47 A.3d 1174 (Penn. 2012) (granting review as to
“[w]hether, in a purported class action tried to verdict, it violates Pennsylvania
law (including the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure) to subject Wal-Mart to
a ‘Trial by Formula’ that relieves Plaintiffs of their burden to produce class-wide
‘common’ evidence on key elements of their claims”).
82. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 A.3d 656, 663 (Penn. 2014) (“In this appeal,
Wal-Mart asserts that it was subjected to ‘trial by formula,’ a practice disap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes . . .
and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend . . . .”) (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 665.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 667.
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entering a monetary judgment in favor of the class, where the court
permits the use of extrapolation to relieve individual class members of
their burden of proof and forecloses the defendants from presenting
individualized defenses to class members’ claims.”86  In 2016, yet
again, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.87
While the Supreme Court has ducked the issue several times in the
post-Dukes era, lower courts will continue to have to work through
these arguments from the defense bar.88  The persistence of these ar-
guments in the lower federal courts and state courts makes it increas-
ingly likely the Supreme Court will eventually have to weigh in on the
scope of defendant due process rights with regard to class cohesive-
ness in class-wide litigation.
C. Weaving Together the Three Categories of Constitutional
Challenges to Certification
The examples in this Article have shown there are at least three
major categories of constitutional challenges emerging in the class cer-
tification process: (1) Article III challenges to the inclusion of non-in-
jured, absent class members; (2) due process challenges to certifying
claims for class-wide punitive damages; and (3) due process claims
based on a purported right to present every available, individual de-
fense against putative class members (and thus holding each putative
class member to individual proof).
Courts and scholars have generally treated these as belonging in
separate doctrinal silos.  They are, however, closely related in their
function in the class certification process.  These arguments taken to-
gether cannot be fully appreciated from the vantage point of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure because they transcend the rules.
Article III standing has long been linked to due process by procedu-
ral scholars who study class actions.  Writing in 1979, Lea Brilmayer
connected the similarity in concerns between due process and stand-
ing in constitutional litigation.89  More recently, Sergio Campos went
86. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Braun, 136 S. Ct. 1512
(2016) (No. 14-1123), 2015 WL 1201367.
87. Braun, 136 S. Ct. 1512.
88. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 149 n.25 (2d Cir. 2015)
(interpreting the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobsen to stand for the
proposition that “[t]he question of how the Supreme Court’s punitive damages
precedent should be applied to class actions has engendered significant debate in
the lower federal and state courts and in academic scholarship”).
89. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the ‘Case or Con-
troversy’ Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 297–99 (1979) (observing “the fair-
ness problems that would arise if an ideological challenger—a challenger without
the traditional personal stake—were permitted to litigate a constitutional
claim”); Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553,
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a step further, arguing that “justiciability is a deep due process
concern.”90
The theoretical linkage in the underpinnings of standing and due
process helps explain the fluid slippage between the two in arguments
regarding causation in class actions.  When a defendant challenges
certification because absent class members cannot show an injury
caused by the defendant, the border between standing and due process
is ephemeral, and the argument flows easily between both constitu-
tional nodes.
Connecting standing to due process concerns in the context of cau-
sation and injury opens up a way to transfer some of the force of the
defendants’ arguments about uninjured class members to state courts.
Indeed, it is a very small logical step to reframe the argument from
one about absent class members failing to show a particularized, con-
crete injury to one about the failure to require a showing that the de-
fendant’s conduct caused unnamed class members alleged injuries,
invoking potential due process concerns that apply in state courts.
Framed either way, when used in the class certification context,
the point of the argument is to show that some of the class members
are so different from other class members as to defeat aggregate litiga-
tion.  That ultimately comes down to a request to defeat their claims
individually for lack of proof.  This illustrates how closely related the
standing argument is to the other species of due process argument
that focus on the need for individual proof in the class certification
process.  Both the purported right to present every available defense
in class actions and the purported right to avoid class-wide punitive
damages are grounded in a notion that proof of causation for every
absent class member ought to be required.
Collectively, these due process arguments against state class ac-
tions add up to more than the sum of their parts: together, they would
create massive barriers to the development of state class action proce-
dures independent of the federal courts.  The arguments jointly seek
to triangulate due process in the bounds of individual litigation, po-
tentially creating a constitutional barrier to any aggregate resolution
of claims.
III. THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
AGGREGATION
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that class actions op-
erate in an exceptional procedural space.91  This exceptional procedu-
600 (2014) (crediting Brilmayer with being the first to observe the connection
between due process and justiciability).
90. Campos, supra note 89, at 613.
91. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application
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ral space is bounded by stringent limits on who may be bound by a
class-wide ruling.92  In federal courts, the modern version of Rule
23(a) embodies these boundaries by requiring numerosity, commonal-
ity, typicality, and adequate representation, all of which the Court has
found “effectively ‘limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by
the named plaintiff’s claims.’”93
These constraints animated the original version of Rule 23 that ap-
peared in 1938 with the first edition of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (FRCP), drawn from the former Equity Rule 38, which
predated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and previously required
a question “of common or general interest to many persons constitut-
ing a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court.”94  Indeed, the committee that drafted the original
version of Rule 23 was of the opinion that such a formulation was “a
common test,” pointing out several states also had such tests.95  In
other words, these constraints pre-existed Rule 23 in equity.
While the federal rule gives concrete structure to the special proce-
dural space, the constitutional limits flow principally from two fa-
mous, mid-twentieth century cases: Hansberry v. Lee96 in 1940, and a
decade later Mullane v. Central Hannover Bank & Trust Co.,97 both of
which predated the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, which gave the rule
its modern structure.  Indeed, the committee that drafted the 1966
amendment to Rule 23 showed acute awareness of both of these
decisions.98
Both decisions emphasized the procedural due process rights of ab-
sent parties, focusing on claims potentially precluded by a judgment.
Crucially, these foundational cases did not involve defendants’ rights.
in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in per-
sonam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has
not been made a party by service of process . . . .  To these general rules there is a
recognized exception . . . the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which
some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those
represented who were not made parties to it.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (describing class actions as “an exception to the
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only”) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).
92. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (“In order to justify a departure from that rule, a
class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury as the class members.”) (internal quotations omitted).
93. Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment.
95. Id. (discussing DEL. CT. CH. R. 113, FLA. COMP. GEN. L. ANN. § 4918(7) (Supp.
1936); GA. CODE § 37-1002 (1933), ALA. CODE § 5701 (1928); IND. CODE ANN. § 2-
220 (1933); N.Y.C.P.A. § 195 (1937); WIS. STAT. § 260.12 (1935)).
96. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
97. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (discussing
notice).
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Later, the Court added to this foundation in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, for the first time drawing a distinction between the level of
due process concern afforded plaintiffs and defendants in class
actions.99
These decisions comprise the foundational “constitutional canon”
related to procedural due process for class actions, namely the cases in
which the Court squarely confronted an issue of constitutionality re-
lated to class actions.100  Finally, Mathews v. Eldridge,101 an adminis-
trative law decision that on its face does not seem to speak to class
actions, has become the modern touchstone of procedural due process
in civil litigation generally.102
A. The Constitutional Canon for Class Actions: Flexibility
and Pragmatism
Hansberry v. Lee is generally understood to be the wellspring of
procedural due process in class actions.103  The opinion began with a
basic and oft-cited premise, famously pronouncing that “one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process.”104  The Court nevertheless recognized that class
actions are an exception to this maxim, and this exception has an old
pedigree.  Thus, “there is scope within the framework of the Constitu-
tion for holding in appropriate cases that a judgment rendered in a
class suit is res judicata as to members of the class who are not formal
parties to the suit.”105  In other words, by the middle of the twentieth
century, it was clear that the Constitution allows class actions to bind
absent parties if properly certified.
99. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
100. There are, of course, many other important Supreme Court cases about class ac-
tions that are not constitutional decisions; rather they are interpretations of Rule
23.
101. 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976) (reviewing procedures to terminate Social Security
benefits).
102. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (applying the Mathews bal-
ancing test to ex parte attachment procedures in individual civil litigation); Hel-
ler v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1993) (applying the Mathews balancing test to
state procedures used for involuntary commitment of mentally infirm persons);
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716–17 (2003) (per curiam) (applying
the Mathews balancing test to municipal  procedures adjudicating challenges to
enforcement of car-towing ordinance); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–30
(2004) (plurality opinion) (applying the Mathews balancing test to procedures for
adjudicating a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging detainment of al-
leged enemy combatant).
103. Campos, supra note 89, at 571 n.105.
104. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
105. Id. at 42.
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The Court expressly recognized in Hansberry that neither states
nor federal courts were compelled by the Constitution “to adopt any
particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of judgments in
class suits.”106  In other words, while due process permitted class ac-
tions, it did not require any particular form of them.  The rules for
class actions were left to the good judgment of the state and federal
courts.  Indeed, the Court even acknowledged the importance of feder-
alism and variability in that procedure, emphasizing “a proper regard
for divergent local institutions and interests.”107  Thus, from the
Court’s earliest analysis of the constitutionality of class actions, flexi-
bility was the essence of the procedural fabric.  Divergent local inter-
ests were woven into that fabric by design.
In sketching the outer constitutional boundary of that variability
in class procedure, the Court held that due process would be violated
“only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties
who are to be bound by it.”108  Under the facts of Hansberry, such pro-
tection was missing because the parties who sought to enforce a cove-
nant could not be in the same class with, and represent, the interests
of those resisting performance of the same covenant.109  Conflicting
interest among the putative parties to the agreement created a due
process problem to enforcement of the class judgment—one group
could not fairly represent the other in the litigation.
Having declared the outer constitutional boundaries of adequate
representation in Hansberry, the Court clarified the constitutional
boundaries of the right to notice a decade later in Mullane v. Central
Hannover Bank & Trust Co.110 Mullane did not involve a class action,
but rather a different kind of aggregate litigation involving benefi-
ciaries of pooled investment trusts.111  The issue was whether the ac-
counting settlement would bind absent beneficiaries—analogous to
the way a modern class judgment would bind absent class members.
Because the action would terminate the potential claims of such bene-
ficiaries, the Court held that due process required reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard.112  The Court rejected New York’s
notice-publication statute, as newspaper publication was unlikely to
reach the intended beneficiaries.  It famously declared “process which
is a mere gesture is not due process.”113  However, it also rejected the
petitioner’s request to require notice by personal service to the large
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 44.
110. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
111. Id. at 310–11.
112. Id. at 314.
113. Id. at 315.
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group of potential beneficiaries.114  Instead, due process required con-
sideration of the nature of the class of beneficiaries here, and it was
satisfied so long as the form was “reasonably certain to reach most of
those interested in objecting.”115  In other words, the nature of the
class of beneficiaries, the limits of the fund, and the practical chal-
lenges of delivering the notice were factors weighed in the constitu-
tional balance, and “perfect” notice by individual, personal service was
not the constitutional touchstone.  Procedural due process thus was
elastic enough to accommodate reasonable efforts, within the con-
straints of a large class.116  No particular type of notice was constitu-
tionally required; rather, a pragmatic, flexible standard applied, even
allowing for the risk that it might not be effective at reaching every
single beneficiary.117
This pragmatism mirrors the flexible approach announced in Han-
sberry.  Indeed, in the latter half of the twentieth century, flexibility
was the very hallmark of the constitutional ideal of procedural due
process in court proceedings in many different contexts.118  Rather
than defining the methods for exactly how a state must in all circum-
stances implement the constitutional standard, Hansberry and Mul-
lane left it up to the states to find solutions that worked in particular
circumstances.
The Supreme Court’s approach to procedural due process was rein-
forced as recently as 2006 in Jones v. Flowers, which involved the
right to notice in individual, nonclass litigation.119  Arkansas had re-
114. Id. at 318–19.
115. Id. at 319 (emphasis added) (“[N]o [personal] service is required under the cir-
cumstances.  This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests.
The individual interest does not stand alone[,] but is identical with that of a class.
The rights of each in the integrity of the fund[,] and the fidelity of the trustee[,]
are shared by many other beneficiaries.”).
116. Id. (“[C]onstitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances . . . .”).
117. Id. (“Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in ob-
jecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objections sustained
would inure to the benefit of all.  We think that under such circumstances reason-
able risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are justifiable.”).
118. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due.  It has been said so
often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situ-
ation demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very nature of due process negates any concept of in-
flexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”); accord
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 275 (1949)
(“[T]he right of oral argument as a matter of procedural due process varies from
case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural
regulations.”); see also Underwood, supra note 17, at 797 (discussing the flexibil-
ity of due process in the class action context).
119. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
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lied upon the mailing of certified letters that had been returned to the
sender “unclaimed” as notice of a tax sale.120  The case showed that
Mullane’s flexibility was still capable of generating an outer boundary:
Arkansas officials were aware prior to the tax sale that the letters had
not reached the intended homeowner because the letters had been re-
turned to the sender, and failing to take some other action to notify
the homeowner was impermissible.121  However, the key to the opin-
ion is the Court’s recognition that the additional steps turned on what
was practicable under the circumstances,122 and the Court expressly
declined to specify what additional steps state officials should have
taken.123  Indeed, the Court expressly embraced variation in state so-
lutions implementing the basic right to notice: “The State can deter-
mine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that notice was
inadequate here, and the States have taken a variety of approaches to
the present question.”124
Flexibility and openness to state solutions has been an uninter-
rupted theme in procedural due process from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to the Roberts Court.  The flexible constitutional framework
spawned by Hansberry and Mullane was also the backdrop against
which the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were drafted, creating the
modern federal class action.  Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized
that Rule 23’s provisions were designed to incorporate the procedural
due process standards set forth in this early precedent.125  In Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquline, the Court even interpreted the notice provision
in Rule 23(c) as requiring individual notice to class members as an
extension of Mullane’s standard.126
The Court picked up the flexibility theme again in 1984 in Philips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,127 clarifying due process in class actions
without diminishing the boundary’s flexibility. Shutts presented two
different constitutional issues, both focused on the members of a mul-
tistate plaintiff class: whether the Kansas state court had personal
jurisdiction over absent, nonresident class members, and whether the
state could apply its own substantive law to the claims of absent non-
120. Id. at 224.
121. Id. at 230, 234 (“In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones had not
received notice that he was about to lose his property, the State did—nothing . . . .
[W]e conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify
Jones, if practicable to do so.”).
122. Id. at 234.
123. Id. at 234, 238 (noting that “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of
service that the [government] should adopt”) (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 US
444, 455 n.9 (1982)) (alternation in original).
124. Id. at 238.
125. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (discussing the incorpora-
tion of Mullane into Rule 23).
126. Id. at 174.
127. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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residents whose claims had no connection to the state.  Both constitu-
tional claims were pressed by the defendant on behalf of the class
members.128  None of the class members asserted these constitutional
claims for themselves, and they objected to the defendant doing so.129
The Court allowed the defendant to raise these arguments in the class
context because the defendant “has a distinct and personal interest in
seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata just as petitioner
is bound.”130
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the class members could sub-
ject themselves to Kansas’s jurisdiction by failing to opt out of the
class action.131  Its analysis focused entirely on the burden the asser-
tion of jurisdiction would have on the absent class members, and not
on the burden on the defendant.132  Indeed the Court expressly
framed the analysis in terms of the due process rights of absent plain-
tiffs.133  Those rights afforded absent plaintiffs notice of the action, an
opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, and some
procedure by which a plaintiff might exclude himself from the action
(opt out),134 all which Kansas provided.135
The second constitutional claim involved the Kansas court’s deci-
sion to apply Kansas’s own law to all of the class members’ claims,
even though 97% of the plaintiffs had no connection to Kansas.136
Kansas substantive law was in conflict with Texas substantive law on
the viability of the claim and damages.  Here, the Court found that the
plaintiff class members’ “consent” to Kansas law (by failing to opt out
128. Id. at 804.
129. Id. at 805 (“They . . . urge that petitioner’s interference is unneeded because the
class members have had opportunity to complain about Kansas’ assertion of juris-
diction over their claim, but none have done so.”).
130. Id. at 805 (“The only way a class action defendant like petitioner can assure itself
of this binding effect of the judgment is to ascertain that the forum court has
jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose claim it seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to
support a defense of res judicata in a later suit for damages by class members.”).
131. Id. at 809–11.
132. Id. at 810–11 (“Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class-action
plaintiff is not required to do anything.  He may sit back and allow the litigation
to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his
protection.  In most class actions an absent plaintiff is provided at least with an
opportunity to ‘opt out’ of the class, and if he takes advantage of that opportunity
he is removed from the litigation entirely.”).
133. Id. at 811 (“The Fourteenth Amendment does protect ‘persons,’ not ‘defendants,’
however, so absent plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some
protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their
claims.  In this case we hold that a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the
claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not pos-
sess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal juris-
diction over a defendant.”).
134. Id. at 812.
135. Id. at 813.
136. Id. at 814–15.
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of the class) was not enough.137  Instead, the Kansas court needed to
find that Kansas had a “ ‘significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts’ to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class
. . . in order to ensure that the choice of Kansas law is not arbitrary or
unfair.”138
Much later, the concern over absent parties reemerged in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, where the Court focused on the procedural
fairness of a certification for settlement where the settlement agree-
ment was complex and fraught with conflicts of interest among the
plaintiff class members.139  The Court noted that class certification
should not “sacrifice[ ] procedural fairness,” but again its focus was on
fairness to absent class members.140
These cases taken together illustrate that the constitutional
boundaries related to class certification have historically emphasized
the due process rights belonging to the absent members of the plaintiff
class.  Even when those rights are asserted by defendants (who may
derive some benefit from the preclusive effect of certification, as in
Shutts) the right itself has been a class member’s right in the canoni-
cal cases.
B. Due Process in Civil Litigation: Mathews v. Eldridge and
Its Progeny
The historically flexible approach to due process in class actions
comports with the Court’s approach to procedural due process in other
contexts.  In Mathews v. Eldridge,141 the Court created the modern
procedural due process doctrine now used in a wide variety of con-
texts. Mathews involved the constitutional adequacy of the adminis-
trative procedures to assess continued eligibility for social security
disability benefits.142  A petitioner whose benefits were terminated
without a hearing challenged the constitutional validity of the
agency’s procedures.  The Court recognized that procedural due pro-
cess constrains “governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”143  However, it re-
jected the notion that due process is a bright line constraint: “[D]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands.”144
137. Id. at 820.
138. Id. at 821–22.
139. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
140. Id. at 615 (internal citation omitted).
141. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
142. Id. at 323–25.
143. Id. at 332.
144. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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The Court fashioned a three-factor balancing approach to capture
the contextual nature of the doctrine:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.145
Applying these factors to the constitutional inquiry afforded the
agency substantial flexibility in fashioning its procedures for benefit
determinations.146  The key was that the procedures created “a mean-
ingful opportunity” for affected parties to present their case, even
though the procedures might not resemble a court evidentiary
hearing.147
The Mathews balancing test was subsequently extended beyond
administrative procedures to other contexts, including civil litigation
procedures in cases between private parties.  In Connecticut v.
Doehr,148 the Court relied on the Mathews doctrine to evaluate a con-
stitutional challenge to a state’s prejudgment attachment procedures
in civil litigation.149  Acknowledging that such disputes involve two
private parties, unlike administrative decisions at issue in Mathews,
it adjusted the balancing approach’s third factor by focusing attention
on the interest of the party seeking the remedy with “due regard for
any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the pro-
cedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protections.”150
The Court took this balancing framework a step further in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, a case involving the due process rights of an enemy com-
batant challenging the grounds for detention using a civil petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.151  The Court recognized that the Mathews
balancing test was well established as “[t]he ordinary mechanism” ap-
plied to analyze procedural due process challenges.152
The Court has not yet applied the Mathews balancing approach to
state or federal class action procedures, presumably because it has not
yet taken up a defendant’s procedural due process challenge to such
procedures.  However, the Court’s long commitment to viewing due
process through the lens of Mathews in other civil litigation contexts
145. Id. at 335.
146. Id. at 348 (“The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor
even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.”).
147. Id. at 349.
148. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
149. Id. at 10.
150. Id. at 11.
151. 542 U.S. 507, 509, 528–29 (2004) (plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 528–29.
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suggests that the approach is the fundamental yardstick by which due
process challenges to class certification procedures ought to be mea-
sured.  Indeed, the flexibility of the Mathews approach seems fully
consistent with the pragmatic, flexible spirit of the historical class ac-
tion canon.
C. The New Frontier: Movement Toward a National,
Uniform Class Certification Procedure
The constitutional boundaries comprised of defendant rights in
class actions is a new frontier with an inchoate and contested founda-
tion.  The historical canonical class action cases involved plaintiff
rights (class members).  Beyond that, Mathews suggests a fact-specific
balancing of interests would be needed, though lower courts have not
yet engaged in that task.
Some of the earliest examples of defendants asserting a due pro-
cess right to present individualized defenses can be found in the late
1970s and early 1980s.  These earliest attempts to carve out a particu-
larized due process right for defendants in class actions met with
mixed results in the lower courts.153  These defendant-focused due
process rights have no canonical Supreme Court doctrine to recom-
mend them; they are instead attempts to carve out a new right with
an array of different justifications.
While the constitutional boundaries protecting members of a plain-
tiff class have been expressly articulated by the Supreme Court since
1940, the rights of defendants have to be inferred from other sources.
Defendants sometimes invoke the obscure case of Lindsey v.
Normet154 for the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees
them a right “to present every available defense.”155  In Lindsey, a
class of tenants sought to declare an Oregon unlawful detainer statute
to be unconstitutional because the state procedure set an unreasona-
bly fast timeframe on the eviction process, requiring that a trial to
153. See, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing the
defendant’s constitutional “right to present a full defense”). But see Matter of
Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736, 749 (N.J. 1983) (rejecting “GM’s con-
tention that certification of a class action would violate its right to due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing it from asserting individual
defenses, such as the treatment of the vehicles by each plaintiff and actual reli-
ance on GM’s representations”).
154. 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156,
168 (1932)).
155. See Christopher Chorba & Blane H. Evanson, Other Due Process Challenges to
the Class Device, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 737, 749 & n.74
(Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010).  Mssrs. Chorba and Evanson are attorneys repre-
senting class action defendants. See also Lawyers Search, GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 11,
2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/pages/lawyerssearch.aspx?oid=
LosAngeles#FindLawyers [https://perma.unl.edu/JB9N-5LRQ].
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evict tenants for unpaid rent must begin just six days after service of
the complaint unless the tenant posted security for accruing rent.156
The tenants (who were the members of the plaintiff class) argued that
the Oregon statute violated their due process rights.  The Supreme
Court observed in dicta that “[d]ue process requires that there be an
opportunity to present every available defense.”157  The Court clearly
was referring to the class members’ “defense to their own eviction” at
the trial in Oregon state court, not the right of the class action defend-
ants in the federal declaratory relief action.  In other words, Lindsey
was about the class members’ own right to be heard in their individ-
ual state eviction proceedings.  The right at issue was the individual
one of the tenant in their individual actions against their landlords.
The case said nothing whatsoever about the procedural rights of
defendants in class actions to present “every available defense.”  The
case thus offers no support for the proposition that class action de-
fendants are entitled to present every individualized defense in the
class action proceeding.
Moreover, in the Supreme Court’s analysis, the right to present a
defense was not a right to present any specific substantive defense.
The substantive defenses available in the unlawful detainer action
were simply not a constitutional matter.158  Moreover, defendants in-
voking this argument with regard to class certification have yet to con-
tend with the absence of bright-line rules generally in procedural due
process doctrine.  Extending Mathews, one would expect a court to bal-
ance the relevant interests in the increased procedural protection re-
quested by the defendants (i.e., individualized proof in class actions).
These interests would include: (1) the defendants’ own interests in the
benefit in presenting individualized defenses and (2) the risk of con-
sideration of such individualized defenses in class litigation.159
1. Connecting Punitive Damages Doctrine with Class
Certification
The effort to constitutionalize class certification gained significant
traction after the Supreme Court’s decision in Philip Morris USA, Inc.
v. Williams in 2007, a case involving individual litigation, not a class
action.160  In limiting the availability of awards of punitive damages
to this individual plaintiff in tobacco personal injury litigation, the Su-
preme Court focused on the constitutional limits forbidding “grossly
156. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 63–64.
157. Id. at 66 (quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168, (1932)).
158. Id. at 68 (“The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-
tenant relations . . . .”).
159. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (discussing application of the Mathews test in civil
litigation between private parties).
160. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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excessive” punitive damages previously articulated in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,161 and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance v. Campbell.162  In Williams, the Court held due process forbids
using punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries inflicted
upon nonparties.163  In the context of this individual (non-aggregate)
litigation, the Court observed that “the Due Process Clause prohibits a
State from punishing an individual without first providing that indi-
vidual with ‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’”164
The Court was specifically concerned with “piling on” punitive dam-
ages for the defendant’s conduct directed at nonparties, rather than at
the plaintiff.
As the Court explained, “[A] defendant threatened with punish-
ment for injuring a nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend
against the charge, by showing, for example in a case such as this,
that the other victim was not entitled to damages because he or she
knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely upon the defen-
dant’s statements to the contrary.”165  The holding thus limited puni-
tive damages to the conduct within the four corners of the case at
issue.  However, in certified class actions, the four corners of the case
includes absent class members, once the case is certified.  The other
alleged victims in a class action are not strangers to the litigation, but
are actually members of the class suing the defendant for its class-
wide conduct.166  They will be bound by the judgment, and thus in no
way ought to be deemed “nonparties” in the sense used by the Wil-
liams court.167  Indeed James Underwood has aptly pointed out that
the Supreme Court itself has recognized the due process rights of ab-
sent class members in class litigation,168 so it is nonsensical to de-
scribe them as “strangers” in the sense of Williams.169  Moreover,
arguments that putative class actions (which by definition have not
yet been certified) involve “strangers” (absent parties not yet repre-
161. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
162. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
163. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (“In our view, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause
forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury
that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury
that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”).
164. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
165. Id. at 353–54.
166. See, e.g. Underwood, supra note 17, at 797–98.
167. Id.
168. See discussion of the “due process class action canon” infra section III.A.
169. Underwood, supra note 17, at 797 (“Those who would . . . equate unnamed class
members with ‘strangers’ to the litigation—whose harm cannot be used to punish
a tortfeasor under Phillip Morris [v. Williams]—are obviously misapplying the
Court’s mandate because class members are clearly bound by the results of a
properly certified class action and their claims are finally adjudicated on their
behalf with the Court’s oversight and permission.”).
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sented by the named party) are not necessarily arguments against cer-
tification, if the requirements for certification are met—once the class
is certified, the “stranger” problem vanishes.
Other academic commentators have a range of views on what Wil-
liams means for class actions.  Keith Hylton has taken an aggressive
position, arguing that Williams punitive damages holding implies that
all class actions are unconstitutional, reading the case to imply that
aggregate judgments inherently violate due process because “the only
real plaintiffs are the class representatives.”170  Sheila Scheuerman
staked out a narrower reading, arguing that only some class actions
involving punitive damages are forbidden.171  Linda Mullinex focused
on incorporating Williams into the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Rule 23, concluding that “prevailing class action jurisprudence, inte-
grated with the Court’s punitive damage jurisprudence, is unlikely to
support certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage class.”172  At-
torneys Elizabeth Cabraser and Thomas Sobol argued that combining
Rule 23 doctrine with punitive damages doctrine would allow certifica-
tion of mandatory classes for punitive damages under Rule
23(b)(1).173  By contrast, James Underwood has argued that the Su-
preme Court’s punitive damages cases (including Williams) should be
read as reflecting a concern for redundant punitive awards in multi-
ple, different cases.174  Under this view, certification of punitive dam-
age class actions is beneficial because it avoids the problem of
multiple punitive damages awards against a single defendant.175
This Article does not seek to resolve the scholarly debate, other
than to highlight that the scholars who read Williams as a death-knell
for class certification in mass tort cases involving punitive damages
generally reach that point by combining the Supreme Court’s due pro-
cess analysis regarding punitive damages (in an individual case) with
interpretations of Federal Rule 23. Williams itself focused on individ-
ual litigation, on its face it saying nothing about class actions, so de-
riving its implications in federal class certification logically depends
170. Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV.
LITIG. 9, 29 (2009).  But see Underwood, note 17, at 158 (disagreeing with Profes-
sor Hylton’s “extreme” reading of Philip Morris v. Williams, arguing this reading
“ignores the reams of published federal court opinions treating class members as
parties to certified class actions”).
171. Sheila B. Scheuerman, supra note 17, at 884 (“[W]here harm to the class is indi-
vidualized, punitive damages cannot be pursued as a class-wide remedy.”); accord
Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation After
Philip Morris v Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 433 (2007–08).
172. Mullenix, supra note 17, at 850.
173. Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the
Transgressor: The Classwide Treatment of Punitive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 2005, 2026–27 (1999–2000).
174. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 17, 797–98.
175. Id. at 801.
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on how it interacts with Rule 23.  This is crucial, as it overlooks the
impact of due process arguments in aggregate litigation in state
courts.
Technical doctrinal analysis of the interplay between punitive
damages and federal class action doctrine makes a valuable contribu-
tion in understanding certification procedure in federal court.  In an-
other sense, though, this approach misses the forest for the trees: the
end game of the defense strategy appears to be the emergence of a
transjurisdictional, national doctrine that prevent class certification
in any forum, state or federal.
The Jacobsen case out of Montana illustrates this drift into state
court class action strategy: Allstate tried to decertify the class because
there was a claim for punitive damages.  Montana’s Supreme Court
split the baby, leaving the class certified for purposes of determining
the unlawfulness of Allstate’s company-wide policy, while requiring
compensatory and punitive damages to be determined on an individ-
ual basis later.176  This partial win (allowing individual resolution of
damages, as needed) did nothing to ameliorate the defendant who
wanted out of the class action altogether.  Indeed, all questions
presented to the U.S. Supreme Court by the defendant focused on pre-
cluding class certification entirely based on due process.177
2. Constitutionalizing Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes
Before the ink was even dry on the Supreme Court’s landmark de-
cision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes in 2011,178 some commenta-
tors had already begun to speculate whether it might have a
“constitutional overtone,” even though it was decided solely as a mat-
ter of interpreting Federal Rule 23.179  This path making Title VII
class action involved gender discrimination claims for Wal-Mart em-
ployees seeking injunctive relief and financial compensation in the
form of backpay.180  The Supreme Court reversed the en banc ruling
of the Ninth Circuit which had upheld certification of a nationwide
class under Rule 23(b)(2).181  The class was massive, with 1.5 million
female Wal-Mart employees as plaintiffs.
176. See supra discussion section II.B.1.
177. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d 452
(2014) (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 342624 at *i.
178. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
179. See Sergio Campos, The Constitutional Overtones of Wal-Mart, PRAWFS BLAWG
(Jun. 21, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/the-
constitutional-overtones-of-wal-mart.html [https://perma.unl.edu/H58W-NYY9];
Lyle Denniston, Opinion analysis: Wal-Mart’s two messages, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun.
20, 2011, 2:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-wal-
marts-two-messages/ [https://perma.unl.edu/M6SN-4NYZ].
180. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 365–66.
181. Id.
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Under that Rule 23(b)(2), certification may be obtained where “the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.”182  In addition to interpreting that rule, the opinion also inter-
prets the certification requirements for any class action set forth by
Rule 23(a), focusing on the requirement in Rule 23(a)(2) that “ques-
tions of law or fact [be] common to the class.”183  The Court inter-
preted this to mean class members “suffered the same injury.”184
Moreover, the class-wide “common contention” regarding their injury
“must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution—
which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.”185  As the Title VII claimants in the Wal-Mart employee class
were suing for individual employment decisions, the Court found they
needed “some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions
together.”186  Without a company-wide employment policy at issue in
the litigation, all they had were individual decisions of store managers
for each employee, which made it “impossible to say that examination
of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common an-
swer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”187
This holding rested on a finding that Wal-Mart permitted discre-
tionary employment decision making and had no company-wide em-
ployee evaluation method.188  The putative class relied on statistics
and social science to create an inference of discrimination, in the ab-
sence of such a company-wide policy.189  The Court rejected the statis-
tical methodology offered by the putative class experts as insufficient
to prove class-wide discrimination: an inference of the existence of sex-
based disparity was deemed insufficient to prove the specific discrimi-
natory “pattern or practice” Title VII claim at issue.190
Were a plaintiff to establish such a “pattern or practice” in an em-
ployment discrimination case, a defendant would have the right to
raise individual affirmative defenses demonstrating other lawful rea-
sons for denying employment opportunities.191  In other words, if an
employee seeking backpay were to prevail in making a prima facie
showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show a
182. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
183. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350.
184. Id. at 350 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted).
187. Id. (emphasis in original).
188. Id. at 353–54.
189. Id. at 353.
190. Id. at 355.
191. Id. at 366.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.192  That
conclusion flows from the substantive law of Title VII, not from Rule
23.193  Based on this substantive law, the Court rejected deciding
class-wide backpay using sample sets to test the individual defenses
in order to model the percentage of valid claims in the class.194  Deny-
ing class certification thus turned at least in part on the specific statu-
tory defenses available under Title VII, which Rule 23 could not
accommodate on a class-wide basis.
The decision thus turned on the nature of Rule 23 when combined
with Title VII’s substantive law.  It was fundamentally an interpreta-
tion of the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) (and the relief
available in classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2)) in a particular statu-
tory context.  There was thus no constitutional foundation for the deci-
sion that would transcend its substantive law or Rule 23.
Although Dukes’s holding involved the need to interpret Rule 23,
Justice Scalia considered taking the Dukes opinion out of the realm of
the federal rules and into the realm of due process protection for de-
fendants in a later case.  However, he did so without the support of
any other justices in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, a tobacco case
that came out of a Louisiana state court, in which the defendant
sought certiorari the same term Dukes was decided.195
The case emerged after the Fifth Circuit decertified a nationwide
class of smokers in Castano v. American Tobacco,196 causing smaller
state court class actions to proliferate.197  One case of these spin-off
cases in Louisiana resulted in a victory for the plaintiff class bringing
a novel “addiction as injury” claim regarding nicotine in cigarettes.
The class received a $241.5 million fund for a ten-year, court-super-
vised smoking cessation program.198  When the defendants were una-
ble to obtain reversal on appeal in state court, they petitioned for
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court and sought to stay the judg-
ment.199  The defendants sought review of the alleged violations of
their right to due process based on the manner in which the class trial
had been conducted in state court.  The defendants argued that: (1)
192. Id.
193. See id. (citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361
(1977)).
194. Id.
195. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers).
196. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. See Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1354 (1999) (predicting the proliferation of “son of Castano”
suits).
198. Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 36 So.3d 1046, 1059 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2010).
199. Application for Stay, Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (No. 10-735), http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/PM-stay-applic-10A273.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/ZBM8-H899].
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they were denied the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; (2)
they were barred from presenting relevant defenses; and (3) the re-
spondents secured a judgment without proving the essential elements
of their claim.200
The state proceeding was noteworthy because in calculating the
money needed to fund the smoking-cessation program, the trial court
had broad discretion under state law to make such awards,201 and the
judge assumed 100% of smokers in the state would use the program.
Even the class’s own expert predicted a utilization rate of just 5% (cre-
ating a liability of just under $12 million).202
In the fraud claim, the trial court had decided that individual reli-
ance was not an issue in the trial; the jury in the first phase had al-
ready found liability for distorting the body of public knowledge,
creating a common injury for the class as a whole.203  It thus con-
cluded that there was no reason to allow individual defenses as to reli-
ance in the next phase of the trial.204
In September 2010, Justice Scalia issued the defendants’ requested
stay,205 hinting that he thought that the certiorari petition was likely
to be granted in order to review the due process issues raised by the
case.  In the stay, Justice Scalia intimated that due process may have
been violated by the elimination of a requirement for plaintiffs to
prove (and an opportunity for defendants to contest) that individual
plaintiffs believed and relied upon the tobacco manufacturers’ alleged
misrepresentations.206  Justice Scalia’s stay order suggested that
bypassing individual reliance to decide fraud on a class-wide basis
could potentially violate the U.S. Constitution.207  His stay order thus
indicated that not only was it likely that certiorari would be granted
but also that the state court’s judgment would be reversed.208
Commentators expected certiorari to be granted, and some even
boldly predicted that the Court might instead simply vacate the Loui-
siana decision and remand the case to Louisiana to reconsider in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.209  To
the surprise of many, in June 2011, the Supreme Court denied certio-
200. Application for Stay at 28–32, Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1.
201. Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 151 (La. 1971); Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf
Building Services, Inc., 287 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
202. Application for Stay at 35, Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1.  The defendants had agreed that
the program would cost $153 per participant, but they disputed the utilization
rate. See id.
203. Scott, 949 So. 2d at 1273.
204. Id. at 1271–72.
205. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (J. Scalia, in chambers).
206. Id. at 4.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. SCOTUS Denies Cert. After Staying $250M+ Class Action Judgment, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE & FEDERAL COURTS BLOG (Jun. 30, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
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rari.210  The Court was thus unwilling to use the case as a vehicle to
constitutionalize class certification, at least at that moment.
The state court developments discussed in section II.B in Montana
and Pennsylvania are the direct descendants of the effort to constitu-
tionalize Dukes through the Scott case.  Having failed in Scott, the de-
fense bar continues to push the argument in state supreme courts,
perhaps increasing the likelihood that the Supreme Court may some-
day take up the argument.  In Jacobsen, the case out of Montana, All-
state’s unsuccessful certiorari petition explicitly asked the Supreme
Court to declare Dukes’s holding with regard to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2) to be a constitutional holding binding on the
states.211  Indeed, it pointed out the different approaches of states on
the requirements for certifying the type of classes governed by Rule
23(b)(2).212
After Williams and Dukes, arguments have proliferated in the
lower courts asserting a due process right to individual defenses and
individualized proof in class actions—these arguments routinely en-
compass liability, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
Some lower courts have recently agreed with the defendants, recogniz-
ing a constitutional right to present individual defenses.213  Other
state and federal courts that have considered the question have dis-
agreed with the aggressive expansion of due process to encompass a
right to present individual defenses in class actions.214  The defend-
ants’ arguments thus have met mixed results in the lower courts.
com/civpro/2011/06/scotus-denies-cert-after-staying-250m-class-action-judg-
ment.html [https://perma.unl.edu/H76D-SQPC]; Denniston, supra note 179.
210. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Jackson, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).
211. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–21, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 310 P.3d
452 (2014) (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 342624 at *20–21.
212. Id. at 25 (discussing the approaches of Montana, New Mexico, and Ohio’s courts
in certifying class actions).
213. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Performance Food Grp., Inc. 16 F. Supp. 3d
576, 580–81 (D. Md. 2014) (“The Court finds the EEOC class-wide award ap-
proach not only unworkable, but also violative of the rights of PFG and, poten-
tially, the rights of those individuals on whose behalf the EEOC has made a
claim.”); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., L.L.C., 309 F.R.D. 631, 642–44 (S.D. Cal. 2015)
(finding that in order to comply with due process, the defenses must be able to
present all individual defenses it might have in the damages phase of the class
action). Accord McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–33 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that aggregate litigation of liability for the class followed by indi-
vidualized distribution violates due process); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F. 3d
300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A defendant has a . . . due process right to challenge the
proof used to demonstrate class membership . . . .”); Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951
So. 2d 860, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Although a trial court confronting a
massive class action may find it tempting to allow proof of ‘patterns’ and ‘common
schemes’ to paper over the dissimilarities attendant to individual claims, consid-
erations of administrative convenience do not trump the class action.”).
214. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 197–98 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“Challenges that such aggregate proof affects substantive law and
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Despite the mixed results, the due process arguments have become
a common theme in challenges to class certification: defendants regu-
larly claim their due process rights will be violated if they cannot “pre-
sent every available defense,”215 which they assert can only be done
individually.
D. Scholarly Critiques of the New Due Process Constraints
in Class Actions
Expanding defendant procedural due process rights to restrict
class certification has generally not been well received by most aca-
demic commentators.  Alexandra Lahav has observed that under the
“traditional conception of due process,” the right embodied “the pro-
cess and rights traditionally available in Anglo-American law.”216  If
this is the foundation, then then the history of Anglo-American under-
standings of the right must be the starting point.
Carefully tracing the procedural due process rights of civil defend-
ants from the Framing period forward to the twenty-first century,
otherwise violates the defendant’s due process or jury trial rights to contest each
member’s claim individually, will not withstand analysis.”); Jimenez v. Allstate
Ins. Co. 765 F.3d 1161, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]n this circuit . . . damage
calculations alone cannot defeat class certification, . . . .”) (quoting Yokoyama v.
Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)); Mullins v. Di-
rect Dig., L.L.C., 795 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a heightened as-
certainability requirement for class certification based on due process); Iorio v.
Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2009 WL 3415703, *3 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting
the argument that “individualized hearings on the issue of punitive damages are
necessary to preserve due process rights”); see id. at *6 (“Defendant’s argument
that individualized hearings regarding the extent of injury and the circumstances
surrounding the injury are necessary to satisfy due process is not persuasive.”).
Accord Joseph v. Gen. Motors Corp. 109 F.R.D. 635 (D. Colo. 1986) (rejecting
“GM’s contention that certification of a class action in this case would violate its
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing it
from asserting individual defenses such as treatment of the vehicles by each of
the plaintiffs (if relevant), and actual reliance on GM’s express warranties and
representations.”); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Outback Steak House of
Fla., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206–07 (D. Colo. 2008); Nat’l Cash, Inc. v. Love-
less, 205 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Ark. 2005) (“The mere fact that individual issues and
defenses may be raised by the company regarding the recovery of individual
members cannot defeat class certification where there are common questions con-
cerning the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing which must be resolved for all class
members.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Gill, 221 S.W.3d 841, 857 (Tex. App. 2007),
vacated on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp v. Gill, 299 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2009)
(rejecting defendant’s due process argument regarding individual defenses); Hale
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 215, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]here is no
absolute right to individualized determinations of damages.”); Perrine v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815 (W.V. 2010) (concluding the defendant’s
individual evidence arguments had “no merit”).
215. See Chorba & Evanson, supra note 155, at 749 & n.74.
216. Alexandra Lahav, The Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 546
(2012).
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Mark Moller observes the Framing generation of lawyers inherited a
common law tradition regarding evidence and proof that was quite re-
strictive and frequently barred juries from considering probative evi-
dence.217  This tradition also “heavily regulated, and rationed, parties’
proof opportunities by policing parties’ burdens of proof . . . ,”218 and
“there was simply no absolute right to present any particular quan-
tum of evidence.”219  Rather, courts had broad discretion to control the
submission of evidence.220  Thus, due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment would not have protected a defendant’s right to “every available
defense” in the traditional understanding at the time of the Bill of
Rights’ adoption.
According to Moller’s historical research, due process instead was
understood by the Framing generation to mean “a right to a hearing
before an independent judiciary prior to the deprivation of rights.”221
He describes due process as focused (since the time of the Magna
Carta) on “the institution that must do the depriving” of those rights
(namely “a deliberative, independent judiciary”).222  Under this view,
due process was a structural buffer to protect against “legislative in-
terference in courts’ traditional discretion to determine ‘the effect of
evidence.’”223  Moller presents a persuasive case for the conclusion
that the Framing generation understood the term in the narrow sense
as had long been understood by English lawyers.224
Based on an analysis of both modern procedural due process doc-
trine and history, he concludes these class action due process claims
“are losers”225 because they are founded on long-repudiated views of
due process.  He demonstrates that the history of these modern de-
fense arguments against class certification are firmly rooted in the
due process notions popularized at the turn of the twentieth century
in the Lochner era.226  He connects the emergence of a right to present
“all facts” to the Lochner Court’s expansive view of both procedural
and substantive due process, a view that collapsed with the New Deal
Court.227  Moller argues that the economic substantive due process
217. Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants’ New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 319,
343 (2012).
218. Id. at 344.
219. Id. at 348.
220. Id. at 320, 348.
221. Id. at 336.
222. Id. at 337.
223. Id. at 366.
224. See id. at 363 (discussing the writing of John Adams and Alexander Hamilton).
225. Id. at 324.
226. Id. at 322 (referring to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
227. Id. at 322.  Moller points out that by the end of the nineteenth century, the un-
derstanding of due process had shifted to focus on the outcome rather than the
institution, focusing on the “truth-seeking value of robust adversarial presenta-
tion of evidence.” Id. at 368.  As the Lochner-era shifted to focus upon “unaccept-
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concerns of the Lochner era were deeply connected with the emergence
of a procedural focus on a full and fair defense.228
As the Lochner-era collapsed into the New Deal era in the early
twentieth century, Moller opines that Hansberry v. Lee marked the
end of the pre-New Deal view of procedural due process, reducing due
process in the class action to adequate representation, free of in-
traclass conflicts of interest.229  He points out the Court ignored argu-
ments before it about the failure to present all the facts related to the
enforceability of a racial covenant, which Hansberry’s attorneys had
presented in the Lochner-era mode: Hansberry should not be deprived
of his property without a chance to present all facts relevant to his
defense of that property.230  The Court ignored that argument, focus-
ing entirely on the structural defect in class representation.231
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court shifted to bal-
ancing concerns with efficiency against the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion, anticipating the modern Mathews v. Eldridge approach.232  All of
this leads to a conclusion that the modern constitutionalization of cer-
tification has no viable support in constitutional history without reviv-
ing Lochner-era understandings of due process.
Jill Wieber Lens makes an important contribution to the historical
rebuttal of the purported right to “every available individual defense”
by showing that the judicial understanding of procedural due process
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification would not
have supported the modern defense arguments about due process.233
She observes that punitive damages were already an established part
of American tort law, and nineteenth century courts required no spe-
cific procedures regarding such damages or their defenses.234
ably high risk of an erroneous liability judgment” that might deprive one of
property, the adversarial hearing came to embody the right to mount a defense
based on “all of the facts.” Id. at 371–73.
228. Id. at 373–76.
229. Id. at 379.
230. Id. at 380.
231. Id. at 381–82.
232. Id. at 382; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
233. Jill Wieber Lens, Tort Law’s Deterrent Effect and Procedural Due Process, 50
TULSA L. REV. 115, 137 & n.151 (2014).
234. Id. at 137 & n.151 (“In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
punitive damages were undoubtedly an established part of the American common
law of torts.  It is just as clear that no particular procedures were deemed neces-
sary to circumscribe a jury’s discretion regarding the award of such damages, or
their amount.”) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26–27
(1991)) (Scalia. J., concurring); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive
Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters
Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 204–06 (2003) (recognizing the existence of pu-
nitive damages in the nineteenth century).
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Lens argues that the historical values underlying procedural due
process also fail to support the constitutionalization of class certifica-
tion and attacks on punitive damages.  She describes a “process-based
theory of due process,” that at best protects the right of a defendant to
“participate meaningfully.”235  She points out that both Walmart and
Philip Morris had these rights in the relevant litigation that came
before the Supreme Court.  She argues that this meaningful participa-
tion turned not on the “subjective desires” of these defendants to pre-
sent any particular proof, but on the ability to present defenses
responsive to the tried, aggregate claims.236
Lens also identifies an “outcome-based theory” of procedural due
process that “requires procedures necessary to achieve substantively
accurate outcomes.”237  She contends that any alleged increase in ac-
curacy through individual proceedings would be “inconsequential,”
when compared to the extensive costs of non-aggregate litigation.238
This balancing under her outcome-based theory reflects the bal-
ancing test in Mathews, which balanced the value in additional proce-
dural protections against their cost to assess procedural due
process.239  As discussed in section III.B, the Mathews decision re-
flected the same flexible pragmatism at the heart of the mid-twentieth
century canonical class action decisions.240  Under Mathews, there is
no bright-line right to any particular procedure ensuring absolute ac-
curacy; instead, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”241  This was a fun-
damental shift away from the traditional view of due process (based
on history) toward a cost-benefit approach weighing the risk that a
procedure may produce errors in outcome against the benefit that in-
creased procedural safeguards might produce for the parties or the
government.242
In the era of the canonical due process cases, Lahav points out that
the class action device generally fared well in this balancing ap-
235. Lens, supra note 233, at 138.
236. Id. at 140.
237. Id. at 141.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 148.; see discussion supra Part III.B.
240. See supra section III.A–B (discussing Hansberry, Mullane, and Mathews).
241. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); see also Lens, supra note 233, at 150 (noting that “Mathews
acknowledged that improved accuracy cannot be the only consideration—perfect
accuracy is not attainable and constitutionality should not be based on attempts
to achieve the impossible.  Plus, a categorical right would also be absurdly broad;
the defendant would be entitled to any procedural protections that might improve
the accuracy of the results, perhaps even only infinitesimally.  But perfect accu-
racy is not possible and the Court recognizes so.  Thus, the Court likely did not
mean to define some new broad outcome-based right for defendants.”).
242. Lahav, supra note 216, at 550.
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proach.243  She reads Wal-Mart v. Dukes as a retreat away from this
balancing approach toward bright-line procedural rules.244  However,
she suggests that the balancing framework could have equally empha-
sized the benefits of aggregate litigation.245  The cost-benefit balanc-
ing model of due process thus does not offer much of a foundation for
the modern constitutional arguments against certification.
Lahav identifies one theory of due process that could support the
expansion of procedural due process sought by class action defend-
ants: a “dignitary theory” based on the value of individual participa-
tion in the judicial process.246  This theory was birthed by scholars,
not courts.  She sees the “threads of the dignitary theory” woven into
defense arguments asserting a due process right to present individual
defenses in class actions, even though courts have not picked up on
these threads.247  It is crucial to note this is a theory in search of doc-
trine, as this theory of due process has not been reified by precedent.
This is, at best, an argument for a version of right that does not yet
exist in the Supreme Court’s due process decisions.  It would require
jettisoning both Mathews’s cost-benefit balance and traditional views
of due process.
Finally, Lahav also identifies an “equality” view of due process
based on a notion that the doctrine should equalize the litigation op-
portunities for individuals and the outcomes of people with similar sit-
uations.248  Here, the purported right to individual defenses gains no
traction.  Lahav argues that class actions equalize adversarial liti-
gants with respect to resources by allowing class members to band
together against a better-funded opponent, and also by ensuring like
outcomes among class members.249
These academic criticisms of the defendant-centric view of due pro-
cess in class certification collectively erode the constitutional ground-
ing for the purported right, absent a major shift in due process
doctrine from the Court.  Lower federal courts that have recognized
these rights to prevent class certification appear to have been una-
ware of the missing doctrinal foundation for these rights, at least as a
matter of federal procedural due process doctrine.
There is another very important reason to be dubious of the re-
working of due process doctrine to attack class certification that has
not yet been explored in the scholarly critiques—federalism.  The im-
243. Id. at 551 (discussing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985),
in which the Court weighed the value of the benefits of class litigation against the
economic cost of individual litigation).
244. Id. at 553.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 554.
247. Id. at 555.
248. Id. at 555–56.
249. Id. at 556–57.
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portance of federalism in procedure has generally been ignored by the
scholarship examining the due process doctrine in this context.  Part
III fills that gap, layering on the constitutional value of federalism as
an independent concern that ought to prevent the Supreme Court
from reworking due process to tinker with the class certification
process.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING FEDERALISM IN THE CLASS ACTION
LANDSCAPE
Thomas Main wisely pointed out in 2003 that “[c]enturies of legal
history confirm that flexible and discretionary rules and standards of
any form tend to rigidify over the course of time.”250  He made this
observation at the dawn of the twenty-first century, in the context of
the changing interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
generally.251  Indeed, he showed that the Supreme Court’s increas-
ingly technical, narrow, obstacle-strewn interpretations of Rule 23
“constrain[ed] judicial inventiveness” in mass tort litigation.252  His
observation, however, has implications far beyond Rule 23.
Procedural due process in the latter half of the twentieth century
evolved into a constitutional doctrine that embraced pragmatic solu-
tions to unique factual circumstances, giving states broad latitude to
craft local solutions.253  The potential expansion of procedural due
process to bar class certification in state courts at issue here would
ossify that procedural fabric through bright-line constitutional rules
setting forth mandatory certification procedures for class actions—ex-
actly the sort of rigid specificity the Court rejected in Hansberry, Mul-
lane, Flowers, and Mathews.
The ossification Main described in the interpretation trends for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is threatening to jump out of the
space of rule interpretation, into procedural due process doctrine,
where it would affect the states.  The post-Dukes challenges to state
class certification seek to impose hard restrictions upon the states’
ability to certify class actions by constitutionalizing limitations on cer-
tification.  Recognizing the procedural due process right to present all
available individual defenses would hamstring the states’ ability to
have their own class action certification rules differing from the most
restrictive readings of Rule 23 by constitutionalizing those readings.
By constitutionalizing class certification objections, the defense bar
is essentially arguing that there can only be “one procedure” to certify
250. Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 429, 479 (2003).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 489–90, 508 (“[M]ore and longer procedural rules will never anticipate all of
the eccentricities that fate or human ingenuity are ‘virile enough to devise.’”).
253. See supra section III.A (discussing Mullane and Hansberry).
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a class, and that procedure must ensure individualized defenses to
both liability and damages: every available, individual defense.  Under
this view, the states would not be laboratories of procedural innova-
tion; they would instead become exact mirrors of federal procedure.
The defense bar’s attempts to constitutionalize class certification stan-
dards would suffocate the experimentation and divergence practiced
by state courts.  If they were successful, these arguments would even-
tually create a homogeneous, national class certification procedure.
To the extent that Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Co.254 declared that class actions are mere joinder devices,
then the corollary under the Erie doctrine must be that state courts
should be free to follow their own state procedures in permitting or
forbidding joinder.  Moreover, the rules of evidence (which differ in
state and federal courts) have long countenanced presumptions
prohibiting the presentation of probative evidence and restrictions on
the form in which that evidence might be.  Those rules are not “uncon-
stitutional” for disallowing defendants to bring forth any and all evi-
dence they wish to bring.
All of this leads to questions about whether that procedural vari-
ance is valuable: why does it exist and how does it connect to federal-
ism.  Section III.A will turn to the value of state procedural autonomy
in aggregate litigation; section III.B will then examine how this proce-
dural autonomy connects to the states courts’ constitutional function
as independent adjudicatory systems.
A. The Value of Federalism in Aggregate Litigation
The Supreme Court has identified several justifications for its fi-
delity to federalism in other contexts.  For example, it recognized the
democratic advantages of local control, where state governments are
in a position to be more responsive to their citizens’ needs and “in-
crease [the] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes.”255  Additionally, the Court invoked the Jeffersonian view
of states as experimental actors capable of innovative policy ap-
proaches that can be implemented on a small scale to test their effi-
cacy without posing a risk that those efforts will have a significant
impact beyond that state’s borders if the experiment fails.256  The
Court also has perceived federalism’s decentralization as promoting
254. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion).
255. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Em-
powering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 1313, 1324 (2003–04) (observing theories of federalism generally present
in the case law).
256. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure . . . allows for more innovation
and experimentation in government.”).
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fundamental liberties by avoiding the concentration of power in any
one governmental actor.257
All of these federalism theories value states’ autonomy because of
the way that the exercise of that autonomy improves the process of
governance.  In this sense, the theories are neutral: they do not favor
any particular type of policy making decisions within states, but
rather they focus on the procedural benefits of having decentralized
policy making generally.  This means that states could be more gener-
ous in permitting class certification or more restrictive in prohibiting
it—fidelity to federalism does not dictate an outcome, only a process of
decision-making diffusion.  Policy variations are, in fact, systemically
desirable, reflecting experiments that may yet succeed or fail.  These
variations can also represent regional differences in values and social
goals, bearing the imprint of local democratic processes.
This is not to say that there is no outer boundary to due process in
state class actions.  Indeed, Hansberry and Mullane both struck down
state rules that violated procedural due process.  We know that the
notice boundary remains viable after Jones. Shutts also shed valuable
light where that outer boundary line is located, outside the notice con-
text.258  The Court reversed Kansas’s decision to apply its own law to
a certified multi-state class, most of whose members lacked any dis-
cernible connection to Kansas.  In applying Allstate v. Hague, the
Court identified a flexible constitutional standard: the choice of law
could not be “totally arbitrary or . . . fundamentally unfair.”259  In the
context of choice of law, this meant that where the court deciding the
class action had no connection to the suit, it could not apply its own
law without violating the Constitution.260  Nor could it create a “com-
mon question” to certify a class by arbitrarily applying the law of the
forum.261  The Constitution thus prohibited only a procedural choice
that was “arbitrary or unfair” (based on unfair surprise).
Translating this to the certification problems currently plaguing
lower courts, state class action procedures would undoubtedly violate
due process if they were arbitrary and unfair.  With the exception of
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, which involved a novel tort, all of the
other cases discussed above in which certification was upheld, in-
volved areas of law where class action procedure had long used statis-
tical modeling and extrapolation.  As Moller points out, evidentiary
restrictions have been inherent in state and federal practice since the
257. See id.; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1984); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 582 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
258. Jones v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
259. Id. at 818; see id. at 837 (Stevens, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 837 (Stevens, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 821.
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Framing.262  Defendants have a right to expect courts to follow their
own states’ laws in single-state classes; they do not have a right to
rewrite those rules to put on individualized defenses in class actions
where such devices traditionally allow class-wide or aggregate
evidence.
B. The State Courts as Independent Systems in “Our
Federalism”
Against this historical system of procedural diffusion in the United
States, the defendant due process arguments in class actions call for a
form of procedural “uniformism.”263  However, the uniformism being
sought by defendants with regard to class certification is a most perni-
cious kind with regard to constitutional structure: it would eliminate
state courts’ ability to function as separate, distinct procedural bodies
in complex litigation.
The independence of state courts in deciding questions of state law
is a bedrock principle of American federalism.  As the Supreme Court
famously pronounced in Younger v. Harris:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.  This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe
it, is referred to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one familiar with the
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our
Federalism.”264
Younger’s expression of “Our Federalism” has particular salience for
the mass tort litigation in state court because it captures the crucial
balancing of “the legitimate interests of both State and National Gov-
ernments [sic].”265  These state interests have been overlooked so far
in the policy debates about class action procedures.
The bedrock principle focusing on state functions and interests in-
fuses a wide-swath federal abstention doctrine.266  It also manifests in
the venerable doctrine that forbids the Supreme Court from reviewing
state court decisions resting on adequate state law grounds indepen-
dent of federal questions.267  Indeed, this prohibition is so powerful
262. Moller, supra note 217, at 322.
263. I have criticized procedural “uniformism” elsewhere, in another context. See
Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through
the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB.
POL’Y 187, 223 (2013).
264. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 45–48.
267. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“This Court will not review a
question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests
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that where a state court might have based a decision on a violation of
the federal Constitution, or on an independent, adequate state law
ground, the Court still must reject jurisdiction of the case so long as
the independent state law ground is valid.268  This form of constitu-
tional avoidance in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction empha-
sizes deference to state courts as independent adjudicatory systems.
Similarly, the Ashwander constitutional avoidance canon reflects sys-
temic respect for the independence of state courts in declining to pass
on constitutional questions if some other non-constitutional ground
can dispose of the case.269  While none of these doctrines would pre-
vent the Supreme Court from reviewing the constitutionality of class
certification where no other ground could justify the state court result,
the panoply of protective doctrine comprising “Our Federalism” has an
important signaling function: the independence of state courts as sep-
arate adjudicatory bodies is structurally important and valuable.
As separate adjudicatory bodies, it is axiomatic that “[s]tates re-
tain the authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules and
procedures that govern actions in their own tribunals.”270  In the class
action context, where state claims are typically being adjudicated in
state court, this means the states themselves define the features of
aggregate litigation, and the procedural framework for it.  Deviating
from this default role ought to require a heavy showing by the defend-
ants that the state procedure is arbitrary or unfair in the sense of All-
state, or incompatible with the pragmatic, flexible traditional view of
procedural due process in the sense of Hansberry or Mullane,271 or
necessitated through the cost-benefit balance of Mathews.272  This
preserves an opportunity to notice, an opportunity to be heard and
participate, and application of rules that are not arbitrary.  It does
not, however, require the states to entertain any particular form of
evidence, proof, or damages model.
on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to
support the judgment.”); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1871).
268. Klinger, 80 U.S. at 263.
269. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
270. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 137 (1988).  Federal imposition of uniform proce-
dures upon the states in civil litigation is normally possible only in very narrow
circumstances under the so-called “reverse Erie” doctrine where those procedures
are integral to a federal statutory right being adjudicated. See Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362–63 (1952) (holding that the right
to jury trial was so substantial a part of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that
the state court could not apply its own procedure to have a judge determine the
question of fraudulent release); accord Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (interpreting Dice narrowly while recognizing that “[a]
state may, of course distribute the functions of its judicial machinery as it sees
fit”).
271. See supra section III.A.
272. See note 232 and accompanying text.
1070 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1024
A nationalized, homogenous class certification process based on the
narrowest understanding of Federal Rule 23 is fundamentally at odds
with this constitutional division of function.  The aggressive expansion
of procedural due process to accomplish that nationalization of proce-
dure should thus be viewed with severe skepticism.
The flexible, pragmatic view of procedural due process that flows
from Hansberry and Mullane through Mathews comports with “Our
Federalism.”  Indeed, the values align with precision, by allowing
states to adapt to changing factual, social, and economic inputs to de-
velop procedural approaches that strike the right cost-benefit balance
for local circumstances.  That alignment is worth preserving in our
constitutional structure.
V. CONCLUSION
Arguments attempting to constitutionalize class certification con-
tinue to develop in the lower federal courts and in the states.  The U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet taken up the call to create due process
rights belonging to class action defendants in a way that would con-
strain state aggregate litigation procedures.  The issue will almost cer-
tainly merit the Court’s attention at some point soon.
Ultimately, the arguments favoring the due process right have lit-
tle basis in precedent, history, or policy.  The burden falls heavily on
those advocating for procedural uniformism in class actions to justify
the proposed intrusion into normal distributions of power among state
and federal courts.  Importantly, their arguments undermine funda-
mental federalism values regarding the integrity of state court sys-
tems as independent judicial systems with their own unique
procedure.  In so doing, they destroy the historical alignment between
“Our Federalism” and procedural due process.  At present, justifica-
tion for such a realignment is lacking.  Hopefully this Article may
open the door to more fruitful discussion among scholars and courts
about the interplay between federalism and arguments to constitu-
tionalize class certification.
